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In the theory of effective demand, the most established 
concepts are those of Drdze-demand and Clower/Benassy-demand.
Both of them, however, possess an unsatisfactory feature. They 
cannot be reconciled simultaneously with two basic requirements,
namely, that there be a difference between effective demand and
sactual trade and that effective demand be derived from explicit 
maximizing behaviour with respect to the resulting trade. This 
inconvenience led to the development of the theory of effective 
demand under stochastic rationing, which promised to yield a
Imore sound representation of demand behaviour.
Contributions have been made for instance by Svensson [9], 
Gale [5] and Green [7]. Svensson postulates a simple non-mani- 
pulable stochastic rationing scheme, from which he derives inter­
esting properties of effective demand, but which he does not 
integrate into a model of a whole economy. In particular he does 
not ask the question of equilibrium.
Gale [5] on the other hand provides a general framework 
for the study of a large economy, where trading possibilities 
are uncertain. He describes the individual behaviour under 
stochastic rationing and introduces an adequate notion of equi­
librium in this setting. His conditions for existence of an 
equilibrium an in particular of a non-trivial one, however, 
are rather technical, so that their economic meaning is not 




























































































rationing mechanisms remains questionable.
Green [7] concentrates on a special case of Gale's model, 
in which the stochastic rationing scheme's distribution as per­
ceived by the individual agent depends only on his own action 
and on the aggregate values of demand and supply. Under the 
further assumption of anonymity, which means that any agent's 
expected trade depends only on his action and not on his name, 
his result states that such a rationing mechanism must be mani- 
pulable (in contradiction to Svenssons's approach) and that the 
expectation of such a rationing function is linear in any agent's 
own action, provided the individual's influence on the aggregate 
values is neglected and there are four or more agents in the 
economy.1
As Green points out, a consequence of the manipulability 
is that an agent's expected utility function is not necessarily 
quasiconcave, even if the underlying von Neumann-Morgenstern- 
utility function is. This entails that an agent's effective 
demand correspondence is possibly not convex-valued. Hence fixed 
point theorems cannot be applied to prove existence of equili­
bria. At this stage Green's contribution stops, leaving the 
question whether Gale's existence theorems apply to the type 
of rationing schemes Green deals with.
One possibility to solve the existence problem would be
to place further restrictions on the stochastic nature of the
^reen claims that this hold for three or more agents. This is 
contradicted by Weinrich [10], who also reestablishes the 




























































































realization process in order to exclude non-concavities in the 
expected utility function. Another way is to treat the problem 
in the framework of a continuum economy, because then the non­
concavities do no longer prevent the application of fixed point
theorems.
A further reason for the continuum approach is that the 
economy is thought of to be a large one, where each single 
agent has vanishing influence on market aggregates. Likewise 
already Gale assumes in his article that the space of agents 
is non-atomic. Thus, if one wants to check if Gale's existence 
theorems apply to Green’s Schemes, one necessarily has to use 
the continuum framework.
This is done in this paper. In section 2, we first discuss 
the foundations of the stochastic rationing approach to the 
concept of effective demand and its economic content. In section 
3,then,Green's linearity result is extended to the case of a 
continuum of economic agents. Furthermore it is shown that the 
class of anonymous stochastic rationing schemes which depend on 




























































































and which meet moreover the short-sided-rule, consists of 
those random functions, the mean value function of which is the 
uniform proportional rationing mechanism. In section 4, Green's 
rationing mechanism is combined with Gale's framework of an 
exchange economy with a continuum of agents and the existence 
of equilibria is investigated. It turns out that Gale's theorem 
concerning the existence of non-trivial equilibria cannot be 
applied to Green's schemes. We therefore give a different con­
dition, and we show that it is sufficient to assert existence 
of non-trivial equilibria.
2. THE STOCHASTIC RATIONING APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT
OF EFFECTIVE DEMAND
The concept of effective demand plays a central role in the 
attempt to construct a microeconomic foundation of macroeconomic equili- 
brium under temporarily rigid prices. Rigid prices may lead to 
restrictions in trade for someagents. Subjected to such con­
straints agents will modify their Walrasian demand, because the 
Walrasian demand is no longer optimal. The modified demand is 
callêd the effective demand.
Which properties should a concept of effective demand 
possess? There are at least two basic requirements. First, effec­
tive demand should have a sound choice-theoretic foundation, 
that is, it should be the explicit solution to a preference 
maximization problem. Second, it should reflect the fact that 




























































































in the economy, for signs of dissatisfaction such as the unem­
ployment rate are at the center of much macroeconomic analysis. 
Consequently, the effective demand should typically differ from 
actual trade. Moreover, the discrepancy between effective demand 
and actual trade should not be of arbitrary size but it should 
yield a reliable measure of dissatisfaction. This is particular­
ly important for a theory of price changes to be based on market 
excess demands and supplies.
If one examines the deterministic concepts of the Dreze- 
and the Clower/Benassy-demand with respect to these two re­
quirements, one recognizes that neither fulfills both require­
ments simultaneously. While it is true that Drdze-demand 
emerges as the solution of an optimization problem, it does 
never exceed the given constraints. Thus, an unemployed worker 
docs not offer to work. Clower/Benassy-demand on the other
hand does admit offers that exceed the trade restrictions. But 
apart from the fact that these excesses do not provide a reli­
able measure of dissatisfaction, Clower/Benassy-demand is not 
obtained as solution of an explicit maximization behaviour with 
respect to the resulting trade.
If one tries to remove these shortcomings, one realizes 
that with a deterministic rationing mechanism this is not pos­
sible. To see this, consider a state of equilibrium under quan­
tity rationing, where agent a is rationed in his transaction of 




























































































actual transaction by xgh. Then a discrepancy between z^u andah
"ah cannot provide a reliable measure of dissatisfaction, be­
cause first, the perceived rationing function <f>a^ : zaj1w'xaj1 that 
associates demands with trades (and which is assumed to be 
non-decreasing), must be constant beyond z. , , for otherwise 
the rationed agent would have expressed a higher demand:
Hence, any demand greater than z ^  is optimal for the agent,
too. Thus the discrepancy between z , and x , is rather arbi-3.n 9.11
trary.
Second, if the agent would have wished to trade just the
amount x , , also in this case it would have been optimal for ah
him to demand the quantity z ^ . Therefore, if a positive dif­
ference between za^ and x&^ would have been taken as an indi­
cation of dissatisfaction, this would have been misleading, 




























































































In contrast to the deterministic case, under stochastic 
rationing the agent is not sure which actual trade will be 
associated with his offer. Yet he has some information, which 
can be modelled by assigning a probability distribution over 
transactions to his offer. This distribution will depend on 
his own action, but also on the actions of the other agents, 
that is on the disequilibrium situation in the economy:
If one requires that the support of such a distribution extends 
from the demanded quantity z t o  zero (or to any magnitude 
smaller than z it is clear that the expected realization 
will be less than zg^. Therefore, if agent a desires a trade of 
Exa^, say, he has an incentive to overstate. On the other hand 
this overstatement will not become unbounded, because it is 
always possible that the agent realizes his whole demand. As 




























































































the world, this will restrict his offer. Maximizing expected 
utility under the budget constraint
Max
(za 1 ’ za£
Eu ( z 1 a v a1 "a£^
£
s.t. I P^x ^ - 0 with prob. 1 
h= 1
will therefore lead to effective demands E 0)
that possess the two properties required above, that is, they 
result from an optimization problem and they may exceed the 
actual transactions. Whether these excesses provide a reliable 
measure of dissatisfaction, remains to be seen.
So far, the justification for employing a stochastic ra­
tioning mechanism was rather a technical one. More important 
perhaps is an argument that explains which intrinsic motivation 
leads an agent to assume a stochastic rationing mechanism in 
calculating his effective demand. In general, the trading pos­
sibilities of agent a depend on the actions of all the other 
agents, that is,the transaction is a function
xah ^ah^zh^ ^ah^“ah’^ah^’
where z^ : A -> |R is a list of effective demands on market h of
all agents a £ A and z ̂  = zh (a) , Z&h : A ̂  {a} + |R, ZahO') =zh(a’).
If agent a would know the other agent's actions, he could exactly
determine the outcome x , as a function of his own action z , .ah ah
However, in a large economy it is not plausible that an agent 




























































































some market information such as the unemployment rate, aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply or the ratio of aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply. However, knowing only these is not suffi­
cient to determine accurately the transaction resulting from a 
certain offer. Instead suppose the agent substitutes the un­
known variables by some random variable w. Then the rationing 
function becomes a random variable, too:
ah Yahv ah’ h ’ }
where r^ is a vector of statistics or market signals that result 
from the whole vector of demands for good h,
rh = Th (zhJ
and whose dimension is finite and smaller than the number of 
agents. Thus r^ conveys less information than the whole list z^ 
would do. Therefore, even if the true rationing mechanism is 
deterministic, for the individual agent it appears stochastic. 
But this is all that matters, if one seeks to model an agent's 
behaviour, that is, his effective demand.
An equilibrium of the economy in this context is then a 
list of effective demand vectors z : A -* |R^, that reproduces the 
signals r = (r.j,...,r ), that is
z € £ (r) for all a £ A a a v J
and




























































































The special case that Green [7] has considered and which 
we will investigate in what follows is that r^ de- 
notès the mean values of demand and supply on market h, 
that is
rh * W  = fmax (za)l ,0} ,min { h ,0J1 v (da)
(where v is a probability measure on the space of agents (A,A)) 
This is clearly a very simple form of the function 3^, but it 
seems appropriate to begin with such a simple case before 
one proceeds to assume more complex functional relations.
3. THE RATIONING MECHANISM
Let (A,A,v) be a probability space of agents which is as­
sumed to be either atomless or such that A contains a finite 
number of agents only, I, say, which then all have the same 
measure v(a) = a € A. The effective demands and sup­
plies of agents on a certain market are described by an element 
of the linear space Z = (z : A -+ |R | z is integrable}1 .
Define z+ : A -* |R by z+ = max {z,0} and z : A -* |R by 
z = min (z,0). Then, for any z € Z, mean effective demand and 
supply are given by Z+ = /z+dv and Z = /z dv. A stochastic ra­
tioning mechanism is a function 4> : Z x Q ■+ z , where (£},<X,P) is 
a certain probability space. More precisely, the rationing 
scheme dealt with here is assumed to be a function as follows.
1Integrabi1ity presumes implicitly measurability. |R is always 



























































































A(0) For any z £ H, to € ft, the integrable function
(p (z,w) : A -> |R is of the form
<fr(z,u>)(a) = 4>a (z (a) ,Z+, Z",u) a € A.
For any z £ Z, a € A, <p -(z (a) , Z +, Z , •) is a randoma
variable.1
<J> is eventually subject to
A(i) For all z £ Z, v-almost all a 6 A,
I 4>a (z (a) ,Z+,Z",o)) | < |z(a) | P-a.e.
Afii) For all z £ Z, v-almost all a £ A,
z (a) <p (z (a), Z+, Z ,u>) > 0 P-a.e.
A Ci ii) For every z £ Z,
f<p (z (a) ,Z +, Z ,w) v (da) = 0 P-a.e.
A(iv) For all z £ Z and v-almost all a.j ,a2 G A:
z (a1) = z(a2) implies U a  ̂, Z+, Z~) = E<j>a (z , Z+ , Z-)
A(v) For v-almost all a £ A, the distribution of
<J> (z(a),Z+,Z ,•) is weakly continuous in its
3
+ - 2arguments, whenever Z > 0 or Z < 0 .
^hat is, a measurable function (|R,B) .
2Excluding the points (z(a),0,0) from the continuity assumption 
is necessary in order to allow for rationing functions of the
form <J) (z(a),Z ,Z ,w) = <J> (z (a) — , w) . The distribution of
a Z +
such functions cannot be continuous at Z =Z =0, since they 




























































































A(vi) For all z £ Z and v-almost all a £ A:
z(a)(Z~ + Z + ) < 0 implies E<J> (z(a),Z + ,Z ) = z(a)
Conditions A(i) and A(ii) formalize the voluntariness of 
trade. A(iii) requires that the rationing mechanism be consistent. 
A(iv) states that agents who offer the same transaction, can 
expect the same realizations, regardless of their name. There­
fore, this property is called "anonymity". Naturally it does 
not mean that agents expressing the same demand will also real­
ize the same trades. While condition A(v) is a technical re­
quirement, A(vi) expresses the "short-sided-rule", which re­
quires that only one side of the market is rationed, namely 
the "long" side. An example of a rationing mechanism satisfying 
A(0) to A(vi) is provided by Gale [5, pp. 329-332].
THEOREM 1. Let I > 4. If (J) is a stochastic rationing mechanism
as stated in A(0), then, under conditions A(i) to A(v),v-a.e.
the functions tp can be writtena
0 z (a)sa (z(a),Z ,Z ,w), if z(a) > 0
'P (z fa) , Z , Z ,w) = •cl P-a.e .
v z fa)sa (z (a) , Z ,Z , 0 3 ) ,  if z(a) < 0
where, for each z £ Z, s*(z(a),Z+,Z ,*)» sa (z(a),Z+ ,Z ,•) are



























































































Proof. The theorem is equivalent to the statement that v-a.e. 
E<f>a (z(a),Z ,Z ) be linear in its first argument, over the posi­
tive and negative half-lines-, but perhaps with different slopes.
Without loss of generality, we concentrate on the case 
z(a) > 0. Let Z+ > 0,1 Z < 0 be fixed and consider an in- 
tegrable function z such that /z + dv = Z+ , fz dv = Z .
Let A+ = {a € A|z(a) > 0} and define X~ to be the negative 
of the mean expected realisation of supplies, that is,
X" = -/ E<|> (z (a) ,Z+ ,Z“)v(da) .
A^A a
Each z(a) > 0 can be written as z(a) = A(a)Z+ , where A is 
a nonnegative function on A+ such that /+A(a)v(da) = 1. From 
A(iii) one has ^
/ Ecf> (z (a) , Z+, Z-) v (da) = X". If X" = 0, E<f> fz (a) , Z+, Z”) = 0 
A+ 3 a
v-a.e. and linearity holds trivially. Thus, assume henceforth that
X- > 0 (which implies Z < 0). Then A(iv) and A(v) imply the 
existence of a continuous function f: |R+ -*■ |R+ such that
E<J>a (A (a) Z+ , Z+ , Z ) = f(A(a))X for v-almost all a € A +
f has the property that for all A such that /A(a) v (da) * 1,
A
/ (f 0 A) (a) v (da) = 1 . Because of A(i) , f (0) = 0.
A
It is immediate that E<f> is linear in z(a) (in the positive
cl
half-line) if and only if f is the identity map. To see this,
let y = — rir-rv • Then / yZ+dv = Z+. Therefore v(A+) A+
/ E<f> (yZ+,Z + ,Z")dv = X" and E<{> (yZ + ,Z + ,Z_) = yX” by A(iv) v-a.e.. 
A a , a
Consider A (a) = ay, a^O. Then, linearity of E4»a implies that
i E<|> (ayZ+,Z+,Z~) E<{.a (y Z +, Z +, Z")
f (A (a)) = --------------= a---------------- = ay = A (a) .
y X“ X"





























































































The problem of whether E<ha is linear is therefore equi­
valent to the question whether every continuous function 
f : |R -*• |R. such that f(0) = 0 and / (f 0 A) (a) v (da) = 1 if
A v,
A : A+ -*■ |R, / A (a) v (da) = 1 and v (A+) < 1, has to be the identi- 
A+
ty  map. (The case v (A+) = 1 is excluded because of Z” < 0) . We 
proceed to show the second of the equivalent assertions.
First, consider the case A+ = A^ + A.,,1 v (A1) = v (A2) = and 
A (a) = (p-x)1A (̂a) + (y + x)1A2(a),
where y = v'(A,y)' * Â- *s indicator function on A^ and x any
element of the interval [-y,y].’ Then /A(a) v (da) = 1 and •
1 A +therefore 1 = / f (A (a)) v (da) = -j- [f (y - x) + f (y + x) ] which A+
yields
f(y-x) + f(y+x) = 2y for all x€[-y,y] (1)
For x = 0, it follows that f(y) = y.
+ n 1 Next let A = n > 3, v(A^ = i = 1,...,n,
and n-2
A(a) = ( y - Xl)1Ai (a) + . 2  ̂(n + x._ - xi + 1 )1A (a) + (y + xn_1)1A^(a). 
Then
n-2
f(y - x.j j: ♦ f(y ♦ Xj - xi + 1) ♦ f(y + xn-1) = ny (2)
for all x^,... »xn_̂  such that y - x^ > 0, y + x^ - x ^  > 0, 
i * 1,... ,n-2,and y + xn_ ^ 0 .  For n = 3, x^ = x2 = y» (2) 
results in f (0) + f(y) + f(2y) = 3y and hence f(2y) = 2y. For
n t 3, x^ = iy, i « 1,...,n-1, (2) yields (n - 1)f (0) 
and therefore y ,»
f(ny) » ny for all n € |N
= ny,
(3)



























































































Thus f is the identity on all points ny. It remains to show that 
f has this property for all rational multiples of y too, from 
which the assertion will follow because of the continuity of f.
From (1), f(y + x.|-x2) = 2 y - f ( y - x ^ + x 2), which together 
with (2) yields f (y - x 1) + f (y + x2) = y + f (y - x^+ x2) . Set
x 2 = -x1 to receive f(y + x2)= j y + yf(y + 2x2). Especially,
for x2 - (n - 1 + r)y, n > 1 , r € |R+, one has
f ((n + r)y) = j y + j f ((2n - 1 + 2r) y) . (4)
Now consider the special case where r = -2-, p,qG [N. Then,
2 q
we claim that f((n + -£-)y) = (n + -£-)y for all n>1, p,q>0. The24 24
proof is given by induction on q. For q = 0 the equality holds 
because of (3). For q = 1 one has by (4) and (3)
f((n + ̂ )y) = - j y + y f ( ( 2 n - 1 + p ) y )  = (n + £)y.
Suppose the equality holds for q - 1. Then, using (4), 
f((n * £)u) - jwjf(C2n-1 * ^rr)M)
■ i u * 1  <2 n - 1 + ‘ (n * ^ v -
Finally, consider the case n = 0, 0 5 p 5 2q . Then by (1), 
f(-E-y) = 2 y — f ( (1 + (1 - -%))y) = 2y - f ( (2 - -^)y) = 2y- (2- -E-)v,
2q 2q 2q 2q
which yields f  (-^-y) - -^-y.Thus, f ( ( n  + -E-)y) = (n + -E-)y for a l l  
2q 2q 2q 2q
integers n,p,q > 0 and continuity of f yields f(A) = A for 
every real A ^ 0. I
So far, the short sided trading rule A(vi) was not used 
in the analysis. If it is imposed, then the theorem can be 




























































































COROLLARY. If I > 4 and if the rationing mechanism <p satisfies 
A(0) to A(vi), then v-a.e.
E4>a (z (a) ,z\z")
z(a) min {- ~̂r , 1} , z (a) > 0 
Z
7+z (a) min {- —  ,1} , z(a) 5 0  . 
Z"
Proof. Consider Z+ > - Z ” >0. A(vi) implies that
/ E<|> (z (a) ,Z+,Z") v (da) = -Z“ . ByA(iv),
A  +E<(» (yZ+,Z+,Z~) = -yZ“ v-a.e., where y = --- — . For z(a) = ayZ ,
a v (A )
a > 0, it follows from the theorem that v-a.e.
E<|> fz(a),Z+,Z') = aE<J> fyZ+,Z+,Z") = ay(-Z") = z(a)(- .cL d £
If Z+ 5 -z", then by A(vi) E<t> fz(a),Z+,Z") = z(a) v-a.e. and
a  _
therefore E<J> fz(a),Z ,Z ) = z(a) min {- v-a.e., if z(a) > 0.
a Z
The proof in the case z(a) ^ 0 is analogous. ||
4. EQUILIBRIUM
The linearity property of the functions <}>a which is assert­
ed in Theorem 1, holds only, if a variation in the indivi­
dual agent's acton does not influence the value of the 
means Z+ and Z~. This can be assumed to hold approxi­
mately in large economies, where each agent has negligible 
influence on market aggregates. Hence an adequate formal 
treatment is that of an atomless measure space of economic 
agents. Moreover, this framework removes non-convexities 




























































































arise at the individual level and which would exclude the 
application of fixed point theorems in demonstrating the 
existence of equilibria. The latter has not yet been done 
for the class of rationing schemes considered in this paper.
As far as Gale's existence theorems are concerned ([5], Theorem 3, 
p.333 and Theorem 4, p.335), they are very general in their 
treatment of stochastic rationing rules and for Green "it 
remains an open question as to whether his (Gale's) conditions 
can be satisfied by stochastic rationing schemes of the par­
ticular form studied in this paper" ([7], p.352). As it seems 
to us, Theorem 3 of Gale [5] applies (in the case of uncountably 
many agents), if some minor additional restrictions on Green's 
scheme are imposed. However, as these restrictions are not ne­
cessary in order to demonstrate the existence of equilibria 
for the type of rationing mechanisms considered by Green, we 
prefer to do without them and give a separate proof, patterned
after that of Gale.
Before this can be done, some more elements of the model 
have to be specified. As before, (A,A ,v) denotes the space 
of agents, where now A is assumed to be a separable metric space,
A the Borel-a-field and v an atomless probability measure on A . 
bach agent a £ A has as endowment a non-negative vector 
(e .,...,e ) e lp? of tradeble goods and a stock of money M > 0 .
Then, the set of feasible net trades of agent a is
i
X = {x f |R | px < M and x + e > 0 }
where p = (p.,...,p » £ |Ra j * a fixed strictly positive price 1 i.






























































































the origin of |R̂ . 1
Agent a's preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility u :X„ -»•' |R, X u fx) = UQ (M -px,e +x) . The allocation
of goods to agents is thought of to be performed by a stochastic
rationing mechanism <J> = (<j>|, . . . , <t>^) , where each (j)̂ is a function from
Z x ft to Z as described in A(0). Hence, for each agent a, with0any proposed action x £ |R and any vector of mean aggregate 
demands and supplies (Z^,Z^, . . . =  (r^,...,r^) = r £ R c |R , where 
R = ( |R+ x |R )̂ , there is associated a distribution over final net trades 
SO <J>a (x, r) = 'G (<t'a-,,••• > 4>ap.) (x , r) .■ For each r £ R , the assign­
ment a Ce ,M ,u ,<)<() (*,r)) is assumed to be measurable with
3. 3 3 3 2
respect to some suitably constructed measurable space.
To the rationing functions 4>a^ correspond via Theorem 1 
random functionss*^,s , . They might be subjected to
A(vii) For v-almost all a £ A,sa^,sa^ are independent 
across distinct markets h = 1 •
Next, for each h = 1,.. .,£, imagine a function
Yh : |R+ >< |R - CO,1]2f . ; il + (5)
with Y^(0 Z h) = (Yh ,0), Yh (zJ',0 ) = '(0 ,V *
A (v i i i ) For any x, > h — 0, z* > 0,
tYj.13,. Zh < 0 3
CO supp sah(xh ,Zh ,Z^) =
{0} , Zh = 0
Xadoes not necessarily contain the origin of |R̂  in its interior. 
To require this (as Gale does) would mean that the agent possesses 
a positive amount of each good h = 1 ,...£,. This is an economi­
cally unpleasant condition that can be dispensed with in the 
present context. However, this implies that Gale's locally in­
terior-conditions ([5],Def.2.,p.325 and [6],p.363) are not ful­
filled. This is one reason why Gale's theorem cannot be applied.
One possible procedure is described in [5],pp.322 to 324. 





























































































for any x^ < 0,Z^ < 0, 
co supp 3D s"h (xh ,zJ,Zjj) =
[ , 1 ]  , Z-̂  > 0
{0} , Z* = 0;
Yh is continuous in (Z*,Zh) whenever Z* > 0 or Z~ < 0.
For an interpretation of these conditions, see Green [7, p.350]. 
In his description, Yh = Y^ = 0 for all Z^,Zj\ Our more general 
version makes it possible that A(viii) can eventually be reconciled with 
the short sided rule A(vi). If, for example, Z^ < -Z^, then 





By A(vii), 2><}'.i(x,r1 = -̂ih h ’ rĥ  v-a‘e * In particular,
v-a. e





1 if Zh > 0
0 if Zh = 0
1 if Zh < 0
0 if Zh = 0
Because of A(viii) and Theorem 1, v-a.e.
co supp £  <J>ah(xh >Zh>Zh) =
hYhxh ’5 hxh ] if xh
oA I
hxh ’6 hYhxh ] if xh
OVI
(7)
Next define for each a G A the feasible set correspondence 
B from R into |R̂  by
cl
3a (r) = {x € |R£ | supp 4>a Cx,r) c Xa )
1 Although (6) and (7) imply that for all r such that Z^O^Z^ 
for all h = 1 the convex hulls of supp D  <j> (xn ,r) con-
verge to the convex hull of supp £> <f> (x,r) for all (x1 1) -> x, 
the same does not necessarily hold for the supports themselves. 





























































































Each agent is assumed to have rational expectations about the 
vector r and to know the distribution of his rationing function.
So his problem is to maximize
va (x,r) = Juad7j<j>a (x,r)
£on 6 (r) . This defines the optimum set relation £ from R to |R ,
3 3Yp
5a (r) = (x 6 Ba (r) | va (x,r) = sup CBa (r) .,r) } .
A complete list of effective demands and supplies is given by
an element z of the set Z of all integrable functions A -*■ |R .
£Each z £ Z results in a vector r of mean effective demands 
and supplies according to
r = J (z*(a), z~ (a), . . . , z£ (a) , z“ (a) )v(da)
A
For notational facilitation define F: |R̂  -* R by
F : (x1....x£) w (x*,x~, . . . ,x*,x~) and set J (z) = /F(z(a)v(da)
£for each z € Z . One more assumption is needed:
£
A(ix) The function p : A -*■ |R, p(a) = sup{ E |x, | |x € X }
v _ -j n 3
is v-integrable.
For instance, if v-a.e. M < M and e , < e. for all h, thena — ah — h ’
A(ix) holds. But A(ix) is weaker, for it allows the sets X
£ ato become unboundedly large. Finally, z* € Z is called an
equilibrium if v-a.e. z* (a) £ £ ( 7 (z*)).
To show that such an equilibrium exists causes some dif­
ficulties because of the fact that the feasible set correspon­
dence B is not everywhere well behaved. It is true that it is 
always non-empty, but if some components of the vector r are 
zero, 8 (r) is neither continuous nor bounded at such an r.
3
a —  £
1 Deviating from Gale, Z as defined here is not the set of 
equivalence classes of v-almost everywhere identical integrable 
functions. Compare [5],p.326.
2 Gale treats this problem in his more general framework by 
introducing the concepts of responsiveness ( [ > Def.3,p. 325), 
relative continuity and relative locally interiority ([6], 
p.363). rn the present context, we are free not to define 
these notions, but the line of argument will be essentially 




























































































Therefore, in demonstrating existence of equilibria, an appro­
ximation argument will be used.
To this end, 3 (r) is investigated more closely.
+ aLet R c R be the set of all vectors the components of which 
are all non-zero and set for each r 6 ,R
a ‘V 1’ if x^ > 0
A (x, r) = n
h=1
' v ’J if x^ < 0
Suppose r £ R+. Then, by (6) and (7), v-a.e. x £ 3 (r) if anda








E pkYkeak k*h k k ak
ah; Pi ] n X , for all r £ R (8)cl
If r € R+, suppose for example that = 0 and all other com­
ponents of r are non-zero. Then, by (6) and (7), v-a.e. x £ 6 (r)
a
if and only if
(a1x1,...,ak_1xk_1,akmax (0,xk },ak+1xk+1,...,a£x£) is an element 
of Xa, for all (a^,...,a^) e A(x,r). That is, xk can become un­
boundedly small without implying that x does not belong to 6 (r).
a
To deal with this difficulty, define
£ Ma + E pkYkeak
h^,[-6heah’Sh----- ^ ------ ] n Xa> for all r € R ~  (9)
LEMMA. Assume A(0) to A(v) and A(vii), A(viii). Then, v-a.e. for 
all r £ R , to any x £ 3 (r) there exists x £ #a (r) such that
■h <$>a (x, r) = 33 <J>a (x,r) .
For instance, if Zk = 0, then by A(viii) no negative value of 
xk will be realized and xk = 0 would do as well.
Proof. If r £ R+,3a (r) = If (r) 1 If r £ R+ , assume w.l.o.g. that 






































































































-]  x [ 0 ,





M + Z p . y . e -
a j*h J  ̂ a3
Ph
Pk
] n x .
]
= (x € IR2, | ax £ Xa for all a £ A(x,r) and x^ > 0}.
Now let x be an element of 8„(r) "* # fr) , that is x, < 0 and 
(â  x^ , . • . , a^_ ̂ x^_ .j , 0, ak+1 xk+1 »• • • ’ as,xsP  ̂ ^a ^ ® 31 (a^f...,a^)
£ A(x,r). Set x = (x1,...,xk_1,0,xk+1,...,x^). Clearly x € £ a (r).
Let B-j , B? be elements of the o-field 2 . Then, v-a.e.
I  %
» * a (x,r)( IT Dh) = H ® * ah(xh ,rh)(Bh) 
n=1 n=I
9. i
- ‘ a M *  ’r5( « V ’h=1 n- I
since x^ = x^ for all h * k and, by (6),
supp<>dak(xk ,0,Zk) = {0} = supp ^  4»akCxk ,0,ZK) . ||
We are now ready to prove
THEOREM 2. Under conditions A(0) to A(v) and A(vii) to A(ix), 
there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. There is a v-nullset Aq £ A such that the statements of 
the conditions A(i) to A(v) , A(vii) , A(viii) hold for all a 6 
Set CK,a ) = (A'vAq .A^A^ n A) and let A-j,A2,... be a sequence 
of subsets of 'K such that An e A , v (An) > 0 for all n and v CAn) + 0. 
Define Z+ c Z?' by Z+ = 7  ̂(R+) and fix z £ Z^ such that
_ 4- ~1. z £ Z for all n. For each (a,r) £ A x R define 
iVn
j £a (r) if r £ R+
Ca O) = j




























































































and set for each n






{ F ( zCa ) ) }
G*(r)v(da)
if a C An
if a £ An
It has to be shown that the correspondence ^  : R -> R is well 
defined. To begin with, it makes sense to take the integral over 
A rather than over X, since both sets differ by a null-
set only. Next, if r £ R , it is clear from (8) that, for all a £ X, 
&a (r) is compact and £a (r)is non-empty. As a consequence of the 
measurability of the assignment a (ea »M , ua , <J>a (• , r) ) ,
K, (r) : (X,X ) -> (|R£, S(|R?J) has a measurable graph ([8],Prop.1, 
p.59) . 1 As the correspondence a -► X clearly has a measurable 
graph, for each r£ R, £.(r) has a measurable graph. Hence it has 
a measurable selection g, say ([8], Theorem 1,p.54). As z is 
measurable, the function gn = 1 g + 1fl z is measurable, and as
n n n n isF is continuous, F ® g“ is measurable,too. By A(ix), F ° g' 
integrable and hence ^ n (r) is well defined for every n and every
R . Furthermore, A(ix) imnlies that £ n (r) c= K for all n and
T • 21
r £ 
all r £ R for a suitably chosen compact convex set K c |R
As v is non-atomic, ||n (r) is convex ([8],Theorem 3,p.62)
Next, for any a £ X and any n £ |N, the correspondence 
Ga : R -> R is closed. To see this, consider a sequence
(x^,r^) -> (x,r), where for each k, x^ £ Gn (r^). Then there
k k ak k ~exists a sequence (y ) such that F(y ) = x and y £ £ (r)
k - aif a i A„ and y = z(a) if a £ A , for all k. In the latter case i n n
X = X -* F (z (a)) £ Ga (r). If a £ X^Anand rfR+, then c£(r) =F(Xa),
1 As each agent a can be identified with his characteristics
(ea>Ma ’ua ’55^a^’ ^a ^  can be written £a (r) = ^(ea ,Ma ’ua ’^ *('»r)) 
= S(£(a,r)) , say, where £: (a,r) (e ,M ,u , 5>4> (• ,r)) is mea-p d d d d
surable, for any r £ IR̂  . The graph of £ can be shown to be 




























































































and as x^ £ F(X ) for all k and F(X ) is closed, x e G^(r) in
3. a. ^ a.
this case,too. Finally, if a £ A^A and r € R , assume w.l.o.g. 
k + k nthat r £ R for all k. As y £ X for all k and X„ is compact,k a athere is a subsequence (y *4) y £ X . Because of A(v) and (8),
+ k a£ is closed at r £ R . As r -* r, this implies y £ E (r), and a a
by continuity of F, x £ Ga (r). Thus Ga (r) is closed at r for 
any r £ R , any a £ 'K and any n, and hence ^ is closed for 
any n ([8],Prop.8,p .73).
IVe have shown that the correspondence ^ n , restricted to 
the compact convex set K, satisfies the conditions of the 
Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem and hence has a fixed point r11, say,
for every n.
As r11 £ / F (X (rn)v(da) + J F(z(a)v(da), u(A ) > 0
A^A a A nn n
and 1, z £ Z+, it follows that r11 £ R+ for each n.
n
Hence % (r11) = C (r11) . Therefore, for each n, there exists aa a v
measurable selection z of £#(rn), such that
r11 = / F(zn (a))v(da) + / F (z (a)) v (da) (10)
A"An An
As each rn is an element of the compact set K, there is a sub­
sequence, again denoted (rn), that converges to some r £ R
It remains to show that r £ /F(E (r))v(da) (whether r £ R
A aor not).
Because of v (A ) - 0 and z € 2 V , / F(z(a))v(da) ■> O.As rn r,
An
(10) and A(ix) imply r = lim /F(zn (a))v(da). Since mean conver-
n A
gence of a sequence implies the existence of a subsequence that 




























































































assume to meet, for every h = 1
r^ = (0,0) implies zj|(a) "*■ 0 v-a.e. (11)
By A(ix),
lim /F (z11 (a)) v (da) £ /Ls ({F (z11 (a))}) v (da) 1 ([8], Theorem 6,p.68).
n A A
To show that Ls({F(z (a))}) cr F(£ (r)) v-a.e.,we first assert 
n ^that Ls({z (a)}) c £a (r), for v-almost all a £ A. To see this, suppose 
w.l.o.g. that zn (a) -*■ x £ |R2 . If h is such that r^ * (0,0), then 
by A(viii) suppC 4>ah(xh ,rh) c Ls (co supp ©  <j> ah(z jj(a) ,rjj) ) .
1 f rh = (0,0), then (11) implies supp^)4>ah (z (a) , rjj) {0}
= supp Q  <pah (xh,rh). Therefore by (6) supp A 4>a (x,r)
c: Ls (co supp©(J> (z11 (a), rn)) c: X and hence x lies in B (r).
Suppose x $ E, (r). Then there is $ £ B„ (r) such that a a a-
v (x,r) > v (x,r). By the Lemma
3 3
there is x £ "8 (r) with the property that »D<})0 (x,r) = <2> <j> (£, r) ,
3 *’ 3 3
hence v (x,r) = v ($,r). By (8) and (9), there is a sequence3 3
(xn) such that xn £ B„(rn) for all n and xn -> x. If r is such + -that or is non-zero for all h = 1,...,£, then A(v) implies
that v (xn ,rn) -*• v (x,r) as well as v (zn (a),rn) -> v (x,r).
Therefore, for large n, v (zn (a),rn) < v (x^,rn), contradicting 
zn (a) £ £a (r). If there exist some h such that Z^ = Z^ = 0, 
then v is not necessarily continuous at (x,rj. But, for these 
components h, x^ = 0 by (9) and we can set x^ = 0 for all n, too.
Therefore, also in this case v (xn ,rn) v (x,r). Further, by (11) 
r^ = (0,0) implies Ls supp2)<j> ah(zh (a)’rh) * {01= supp04.ah(^,rh), 
and as *ah (zjj(a).r^) •» (>ah (xh ,rh) for all h such that rh * (0,0), 
again v (zn (a),rn) -*■ v (x,r), by A(vii). Therefore again, for 
large n, v (zn (a),rn) <v (xn ,rn). This proves
3 3
Ls({zn (a)}) c= £ (r) v-a.e.
^s f B 11) denotes the topological Limes superior of the sequence 




























































































Finally, to see that Ls ({F (z11 (a))}) c F(£ (r) ) v-a.e.,
3
let a € A, y e  Ls ({F (z11 (a) ) } ) and assume w.l.o.g. that F(zn (a))
n na+ y. As z (a) £ X^, X compact, there is a subsequence (z H (a))
d 3
that converges to some x £ X . By construction, x is an element 
of Ls({z (a)}), hence of £a (r). Since F is continuous, y = F(x) 
and so v £ F (£ (r) ) .
As Ls ({F (z11 (a) ) } ) c F(£ (r)) for all a £ X, r £ JF (E (r) ) v (da)a A a
Therefore there exists a selection z* of £ #(r) such that y (z*) = r 
and z* is the required equilibrium.
Theorem 2 guarantees that an equilibrium exists, but it 
does not say whether such an equilibrium is non-trivial for 
it is clear that z = 0 is always an equilibrium. On the other 
hand, an equilibrium z is non-trivial if and only if 7 (z) * 0.
Gale deals with this problem in his Theorem 4 ([5],p.335).
There, he states conditions under which a non-trivial equilibrium 
is asserted to exist. It is easy to see that not all of these 
conditions are fulfilled by the type of rationing mechanisms dealt 
with in this paper. It suffices to look at Gale's condition (iii). 
Applied to our situation, it states that there exists a measur­
able non-null subset E of A, such that for each a £ E
C) If r * 0, then supn <j> (x,r) = {0} implies x = 0.
This is clearly a too strong assumption for consider the case 
that Z^ > 0 and = 0 for some good h. Then r * 0, so the 
premise of C) is met. But for x £ |R?' such that x^ > 0 and x̂ , .= 0 
for k * h, v-a.e. supp •£)()> (x,r) = {0}, by A(viii) , though x * 0,
Intuitively it is clear, that in order that a non-trivial 
equilibrium is possible, there must be some agents who are 
willing to trade with each other, that is, there must be at least 




























































































non-null set of demanders.1 This is formalized in the following 
assumption, where we employ the function introduced in (5).
A(x) There is a good h, 1 < h < i, such that
a) Zh < -Zh - Yh (Zh ’Zh} > eh > 0
Zh - “Zh Yh (Zh ’Zh) - eh > 0
where £j*,£^ are fixed numbers independent of and Z^;
b) there exist measurable non-null subsets E+ ,E of A
such that a € E+ (a £ E , resp.) implies that there
is x^(a) > 0 (x^(a) < 0, resp.) such that x(a) =
(0,...,0,x,(a),0,...,0) € 3 (r) for all r € R and n ci
u (A.,x(a)) > u (A7x(a)) > u (0) whenever 0 < A- < A1 < 1.
cl I ““ cl Z 3. L !
A(x)a) states that an agent who finds himself on the short side 
of the market, can be sure to realize a positive fraction of his 
intended trade, if not all of it. This is in some sense a requirement 
on the efficiency of the market rationing mechanism, for if for 
example <j>̂ = 0 identically, then A(x)a) can clearly not be ful­
filled. On the other hand, if the short sided rule A(vi) pre­
vails, then = 1.
From this point of view, dale's requirement of the existence of 
a non-null set of agents with a "positive trade point" ([5 ],p.334) 
in order to ensure existence of non-trivial equilibria seems 
questionable. For example, if all agents are identical, that is 
all have the same endowments and the same tastes, then there is no 
good that would be demanded as well as supplied,
although all agents might have a positive trade point. But then, 





























































































A(x)b) is illustrated in Fig. 3 where the agent is a de-
mander of good 2, who meets the requirement that u(0,*) be 
monotonicly increasing between zero and x^. This situation 
appears to be not too artificial but fulfilled for a wide class 
of preference structures. For example, if the underlying utility 
function U(M - - P2*2 ’ei + x-\>e2 +x2̂  Cobb-Douglas,
then the indifference curves are of the shape indicated in 
Fig.3. The requirement that on some market there appear de- 
manders as well as suppliers means that there are differences 
among agents concerning preferences or endowments.
THEOREM 5. Under conditions A(0) to A(v) and A(vii) to A(x), 
there exists a non-trivial equilibrium.
Proof. We refer to the proof of Theorem 2. For each r € R , 





























































































verging to r in R that was constructed in the proof of Theorem
2. Consider some a £ E+ u E and suppose that lim^inf v*(rn)
=u (0). Then there is a subsequence, again denoted (r11) , such
a
that v*(rn) -*■ u (0) . As r11 is an element of R+ for each n,
3 3 Tl +
there is again a subsequence (r q) such that either 0 < Z^q 
n - n + n -
< -Z^q or Z^q > -Z^q > 0 for all q. W.l.o.g. assume the first 
case and a that a £ E+.
Then, by A(x)
nn _ nn
v*(r q) > va (x(a),r q)
& _ n
= J uaCyi» • • • »y4) x <) <|)aktxk (̂ ,r qHd(y1 , . . . ,y£))
|R£ C k= 1
= J ua (0,...,0,yh,0, .. .0) ©4>ahCxh Ca) ,r q) (dyh)
> ua (0,...,0,e^xh (a), 0,...0) > ua (0)
for all q. This contradicts v*(r“) -*■ u (0). Thus, £ (r11) is
3 3 3
bounded away from the origin as well as F(£ (r)) and therefore,I ^ ^ 3
as v(E ) > 0, also ^  (r) is bounded away from the origin.
Since r11 £ ^ n (rn) , r11 0, hence r * 0. Thus the equilibrium
z referring to r, which exists by Theorem 2, is such th3t 





























































































Among the assumptions A(0) to A(vi) characterizing the 
class of rationing mechanisms dealt with in this paper, A(i) 
to A(iii) and A(v), A(vi) are standard in the literature.
Whereas A(iv) also appears to be natural in this kind of sto­
chastic model, A(0) expresses a special feature of the mecha­
nism, namely that an agent's actual transaction depends on his 
own action and on the aggregate values of demand and supply 
only. We have justified A(0) as a first step in investigating 
mechanisms of the form xa^ = <J)aj1(zaj1,rj1,<,L>) > namely when 
rh = ( / zh dv ,  i  zh dv )  > which implies by Theorem 1 that <|> ^ must 
be manipulable. This suggests that the result may be general­
ized by weakening A(0), that is, by allowing r^ to be defined 
in ways differing from the one above. A logical connection be­
tween the dimension of r^ and the requirement that be manip­
ulable, may possibly be revealed. This is particularly of interest 
because practically all of the prevailing theories of equili­
brium under quantity rationing rely on the use of non-manip- 
ulable rationing mechanisms. A clarification of the eventual 
need of manipulable schemes for reasons of consistency could 
therefore help to inquire into the validity of the disequili­
brium literature.
As shown in this paper, stochastic manipulable schemes 
are compatible with the existence of non-trivial equilibria, 
at least in the framework of a continuum economy, the latter 



























































































continuum framework might be further sustained by first stating 
approximate equilibria for finite economies and then showing 
that these approximate equilibria approach an equilibrium of 
the continuum economy as the economy becomes large. In order 
to demonstrate the existence of equilibria in finite economies, 
one could impose as a further condition that the random func­
tions s ^ introduced in Theorem 1 are independent of zaj1* Then 
the concavity of the expected utility function can be ensured 
by the concavity of the underlying von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function, and the proof of the existence theorem can 
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